Friday, September 16, 2016

The Walker Administration's "Essential Steps in Obtaining a Healthy Oil and Gas Industry": What was -- and was not -- said ...



Above are the slides from John Hendrix's presentation at #AKRDC yesterday morning, The video of the presentation (about 30 min) is at https://goo.gl/sCCm0y.

The presentation was more aspirational than concrete, but informative in the sense of which subjects were emphasized and which not. For example, a significant part of the presentation was focused on the #AKLNG project, but Hendrix did not bring up the prospect of the state proceeding alone to enter into EPC contracts, something which we and others have raised as a huge red flag. "The most recent update from #AGDC is horrible," https://goo.gl/1r2GNx We (perhaps wishfully, but nevertheless earnestly) hope that indicates some rethink on the Administration's part of going down that road.

And while mentioned, the presentation did not dwell on Alaska's unique tax credit program (what we and others sometimes call "Medicaid for Oil Companies"). If Alaska truly is to regain control of state spending, this is a program that needs to be terminated this coming session. "Why we need to halt the reimbursement of oil credits — and how …," https://goo.gl/vyyfEx.

As the last two questions Hendrix received following his presentation -- from Rep. Dan Saddler and the Alaska Oil and Gas Association's Kara Moriarty -- indicate (beginning at 25:50 of the video), many in the audience perceive a significant gap between Hendrix's aspirational goals and this Administration's performance. Hendrix's response to Saddler -- "message received" -- was .... well, interesting. Many will be focused this coming fall on whether it truly was.

Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Walker's PFD tax disproportionately burdens middle and lower income Alaskans, undermines the overall Alaska economy ...

A tax is a "financial charge or other levy imposed upon a taxpayer by a state or the functional equivalent of a state to fund various public expenditures." Applying that definition, we (and many others) view the PFD cut as a tax because it transfers what otherwise would be retained as income to the state.

But it is a tax that falls disproportionately harder on middle and lower income Alaskans and in doing so, greatly benefits higher income Alaskans. As demonstrated on the chart above, by income the tax rate is between 6-23% on the lowest 30% of Alaskan households, between 3-5% on the middle 40% of Alaskan households, 2% on the next 20% of Alaskan households and finally 1% on the upper 10% of Alaskan households.

If you take the view -- as do many -- that, when necessary to tax, all citizens should support government in roughly equal percentages, Governor Walker's PFD tax in essence acts as a subsidy by lower and middle income Alaskans of higher income Alaskans.

But while that is some of it, that is not the primary reason we oppose the Governor's PFD tax. It is simply because of the adverse effect the tax has on the OVERALL Alaska economy. Here is what ISER said in its report last March: "The impact of the PFD cut falls almost exclusively on residents, and it is highly regressive, so it has the LARGEST ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY per dollar of revenues raised." https://goo.gl/ZxR1Hw at A-15.

Put another way, by transferring money which otherwise is being broadly dispersed into the private sector to the government sector, Governor Walker's PFD tax helps some selected (government-determined) parts of the economy but at the expense of the OVERALL ALASKA ECONOMY. It is, in essence, a subsidy of those able to direct government spending to their benefit at the expense of Alaskans overall.

As we have explained previously, the use of government power to favor some segments of the economy at the expense of the overall is the very definition of crony capitalism. https://goo.gl/3pAAid Governor Walker's PFD tax falls squarely in that category.

Of course, this is not entirely on Governor Walker. The 14 Senate Majority members that voted in support of SB 128 (Sens. Hoffman, Kelly, MacKinnon, McGuire, Micciche, Olson, Stedman, Stevens, Bishop, Coghill, Costello, Egan, Giessel, Meyer) -- which would have imposed a permanent PFD tax -- also share in the blame. But ultimately the House Finance 6 (Reps. Gattis, Guttenberg, Kawasaki, Pruitt, Saddler & Wilson) saved the Senate from itself. The definitive step -- taxing this year's PFD by veto -- ultimately falls directly on the Governor.

It is hard to express how disappointed we are in those elected or who are running as "fiscal conservatives" who voted for SB 128 or otherwise support the Governor's veto or that approach now. Not only have they failed in the commitment they made when they formed the majority after the 2012 elections to bring spending down to long-term sustainable levels (Goldsmith approach), they have compounded the failure by choosing as an alternative the very approach which has -- quoting ISER -- the "largest ADVERSE impact on the economy."

Their legacy? A resulting tax rate of up to 23% on the lowest income Alaskans and an approach which has the "largest ADVERSE impact" on the OVERALL Alaska economy. They fooled Alaskans once; hopefully they will not be given the opportunity to try it again.

Monday, September 12, 2016

Looking to peers for guidance, state funding to UA system should be cut much more deeply ...


Last week while in Anchorage to take public comment on various options under consideration by the University of Alaska in response to budget cuts UA President Jim Johnsen said this:

"We are the most dependent university system in the United States on its legislature for funding — No. 1." http://goo.gl/IXAmTo

But as concerning as that should be, it doesn't even begin to tell the story of how deep the dependence is, or how much of a spending bubble the state has created at the University.

As we have previously discussed on these pages (https://goo.gl/4542nU), the University periodically publishes a list of "peer" institutions.  One category is "Student Enrollment/Resource Allocation Peers."  The University itself identifies the purpose of establishing that peer group this way: "The Student Enrollment/Resource Allocation Peer group is used [to] compare the UA System to other public university systems .... UA can be compared to other public university systems in several common expenditure and revenue categories."

The peer group is then broken down by full time equivalent (FTE) students.  The most recent peer group ranking (published in May of this year, http://goo.gl/YlnvSZ) indicates the University has a student FTE of approximately 16,000, and then lists three other universities within the peer group of "Student FTE Under 30,000."  They are the Montana University System (which includes both the University of Montana and Montana State), the Southern Illinois University System and the University of Maine System.

Using just this peer group -- self-defined by the University -- the depth of the University of Alaska's dependence on state funding becomes shockingly clear.

This coming year the University of Alaska will receive roughly $325 million in state appropriations. That equals $21,875 per student FTE.

Let that sink in for a moment.  UA will receive from the state this coming year over $20,000 -- $21,875 to be precise -- per student. Over $20,000. Per. Student.

The next closest "peer," as defined by the University itself, doesn't receive even half that per student.  According to the most recent published figures, the University of Maine System will receive $210 million in state funding this coming year.  That works out to $10,500/student FTE. (http://goo.gl/1OsFRG at 18)

The other two "peers" are even lower.  The Southern Illinois University System receives $6,406/student FTE,  http://goo.gl/OaZYm1 at 7.  The Montana University System receives $5,780/student FTE, http://goo.gl/AnCICi at 14.

If UA received the same as the per student average received by its own self-selected peer institutions, state funding would level off at roughly $120 million (a reduction of more than $200 million -- a fifth of a billion dollars -- from current levels).  Even if UA received the same as the per student average received by the highest of its own self-selected peer institutions, state funding would still level off at roughly $168 million, a savings of still more than $150 million from current levels.

Yes, President Johnson is right that UA ranks higher than others in terms of dependence on state funding.  But that doesn't get at the core of the story, which is that UA RANKS ASTRONOMICALLY HIGHER IN TERMS OF DEPENDENCE ON STATE FUNDING THAN ITS PEERS.

There are a number of places where state spending should and can be cut back further in the coming session.  State appropriations to the University of Alaska is one of them.  Hopefully, the University and its Board of Regents will have that message clearly in mind in its upcoming meetings and make its decisions -- including those involving the athletics programs -- accordingly.

My view?  Want to consider continuing athletics, then ask boosters to step up significantly in terms of private support. Simply put, apply a market test. If it's not worth it to the programs' boosters to help support the programs out of their own pockets, then frankly it shouldn't be either to the state.

Saturday, June 25, 2016

An exchange with Rep. Mark Neuman on the #AKBudget ...

This morning we noticed that our good friend, Dave Harbour, had reposted on his Northern Gas Pipelines website part of an exchange between us and Rep. Mark Neuman on this year's #AKbudget. The initial repost, however, did not include our response to Rep. Neuman, which was part of the thread from which Dave took the exchange and we think is an important part of fully understanding the issue.

The exchange started with an op-ed by Rep. Neuman in the Alaska Dispatch News which is available at the link in the first post below and here.  Our response to that is in the first post below, Rep. Neuman's below that and our response to his below that.  We believe the exchange helps illuminate the ongoing debate about how much the Alaska legislature really reduced this year's total spend (in our view, very little) and as importantly, the outsized role that reimbursed oil and gas tax credits are playing -- and will continue to play under the recently passed HB 247 -- in the budget.

Those who follow my personal Facebook page -- where Rep. Neuman posted his response -- may already have seen the exchange.  But for those who have not, we post it below or if you prefer, you can follow it on Facebook itself here.

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

What some are missing in the oil tax credit discussion ...


Some involved in the current Alaska budget debate -- potentially including some legislators -- appear fundamentally to be misunderstanding one of Alaska's clearest pending fiscal choices.

In a Twitter exchange over the weekend involving oil taxes, one of the most active participants in the debate -- the Alaska Support Industry Alliance (the "Alliance") -- appeared to be oblivious to the fact that the State of Alaska has at least one alternative investment opportunity available to it for the cash currently being paid out ("invested") in reimbursable tax credits.

The state can either (1) continue "investing" the money in some oil projects, by continuing the reimbursable oil tax credit program, or (2) not spend the money in that way, and by doing so, retain the money instead in savings, where it automatically is invested through one of the state's investment funds (the CBR or Permanent Fund). The latter investment option also produces revenue and those two choices potentially have significantly different outcomes.

The exchange began when the Alaska Senate Majority posted a quote from Senator Pete Kelly that said this "We have no business going down a road that's going to reduce production." The post reflected Kelly's view that reimbursable oil tax credits -- which are paid out of the state treasury -- should be continued simply because some of them may result in some production.

In response, Alaskans for Sustainable Budgets pointed out as it previously had elsewhere  that production itself is not the end goal. Instead, when talking about the Alaska budget, oil production is simply a means to the end of producing revenue for the state. If pursuing production costs the state more in cash than it returns, pursuing production actually worsens the state's fiscal situation.

That is when the Alliance weighed in, apparently arguing that production should always be the state's goal, regardless of the alternative. (The full exchange is available at the end of this post.)

That's simply wrong.

It is critical for those concerned about Alaska's fiscal situation to understand that Alaska has two choices with respect to the money currently being "invested" into reimbursable oil tax credits. The money can continue to be "invested" through the credits in chasing production, or the state can choose not to spend the money, in which event it will remain in the CBR/PFER and be invested along with the remainder of the state's similarly retained savings.

The fiscal consequences of the two are different.  According to the Permanent Fund Corporation (PFC) website, the PFC's "goal" is for the Fund "to produce an average annual real [non-inflation adjusted] rate of return of 5 percent over the long term."  Adjusted for current inflation levels that sets the "goal" at about an overall 7.5% annual return and, in fact, according again to its website, the PFC has earned "over 10% historically."

According to the DOR, the state has paid out ("invested") approximately $3 billion in reimbursable oil tax credits from FY 2007, the start of the reimbursement program, through the end of FY 2015. Using the PFC's averages, if that amount instead had been retained in savings and invested through the PFC it would now be producing somewhere between $225 million (at a 7.5% return) and $300 million (at 10%) annually in earnings (i.e., revenue) to the state.

In order for "investing" the state's money in reimbursable credits to be the right decision fiscally, the return on the credits reasonably must be expected to meet or exceed that goal. Because the fiscal results achieved by the credits are shielded from public disclosure due to competitive concerns, it is not possible to make a precise analysis.  But applying some reasonable assumptions it certainly is worth questioning whether they have.

Again according to DOR, of the $3 billion paid out since FY 2007 only $1.9 billion in credits have gone to projects that currently have production.  As a result, in order even to match on a current earnings basis the revenues which would have been achieved had the money instead been invested through the PFC, those projects would need to be producing an annual return of between 12.5% and 16% on the state's investment.

And the long run threshold is even higher.  If the $3 billion had been retained in savings and invested through the PFC, those annual earnings would have started immediately and continued long, long -- indefinitely -- into the future. Oil projects don't have the same earnings trajectory. Instead, revenues only start after the lag required to identify and develop the project and then end when the oil from that project plays out.

As a result, the project must produce a significantly higher return during its productive years -- 15 - 20% is a decent rule of thumb -- in order to achieve an overall net present value equal to that produced by simply investing the same amount up front in an alternative investment. Here the returns from the successful projects need to exceed even that range to match the alternative return offered by investing through the PFC because, at least using the results from FY 2007-15 as a guide, only $2 out of every $3 spent is resulting in production.

Given that the state is realizing a return on the investments made through the reimbursable credit program largely only through the portion of the additional production paid to the state as royalties, we think it is unlikely that the program is even covering its overall costs, much less producing a return which approaches the levels necessary to make it competitive with simply investing the money through the PFC.

In any event, it is unreasonable to argue that any production is sufficient to justify the program's continuation.  The program only can be justified if the financial returns to the state resulting from that production meet or exceed the returns which the state would otherwise receive through available alternative investments.

Frankly, this is not a call that the legislature is particularly well suited to make.  These sorts of "alternative investment" analyses are usually handled best by major investment funds.  Interestingly enough, one of the best in the world -- the PFC -- is located just a few blocks away from where the legislature is sitting now.

Perhaps the legislature should ask their advice on which alternative is in Alaska's best fiscal interests -- or in the words of the Constitution, produces the "maximum benefit" -- before continuing.

But in any event, no one should assume that taking steps which may reduce marginal production -- when that production occurs only because of state investment -- are automatically bad.  It depends on what the alternative use is which could be made of the money, and here -- because of the track record of the PFC -- we have a very good idea it would be positive.

For those interested, the Twitter exchange that triggered these thoughts follow.












Monday, January 25, 2016

Is the PFD a right or privilege, and why that may matter ...

Earlier today I wandered into a fairly intense exchange over whether the money distributed through the PFD "belongs" in the first instance to the state's citizens (with the state acting only as a banker in making the distributions) or "belongs" in the first instance to the state and, so, is distributed to citizens at the state's beneficence (Dictionary.com: the doing of good; active goodness or kindness; charity).

This afternoon the same discussion broke out during the course of a discussion on Facebook using different terms:  is the PFD a "privilege" or a "right".

I anticipate writing longer on the subject at a later time, and also intend to discuss it during my regular Tuesday segment tomorrow morning at 7:15am on KBYR AM 700's The Michael Dukes Show, but for now thought I would share the afternoon discussion (because it is the one in writing) for those that are interested in the issue, and why it may matter in the upcoming debate on Alaska's budget.

The discussion follows (and is available directly here if you want to make any comments of your own, or follow along with subsequent comments of others).

In response to a post earlier today some disputed that cutting the PFD (as proposed by Governor Walker and the GCI coalition) is a tax on Alaskans. The characterization isn't original with me; it is based on several recent opinion pieces by Clem Tillion, who was Senate President and a key player in the adoption of the PFD. This is how he explains the view: "Upon becoming a state we received a 100-million-acre land grant, much like the land grant schools and some colleges received in the Lower 48. This was to help provide an income base for a large area with a small population. ... The dividend, as envisioned by Gov. Jay Hammond, was to be a share of the earnings of oil and other nonrenewable resources that, unlike in the other 49 states [where the land is owned individually and, thus, royalty revenues are received directly], is owned by the people of Alaska. [In that context,] the dividend is more a return on what we own, like the return on AT&T stock, or as Jay preferred to call it, 'Alaska Inc.' It is not, and never was, meant to be welfare [and] [c]apping [the PFD] is in itself a major tax, and a tax paid only by Alaskans. ... " Here are three of Sen. Tillion's pieces that explain his view: http://ow.ly/XvR7Shttp://goo.gl/zYBHms andhttp://ow.ly/XvRiR.
OPINION: All Alaskans must contribute to a balanced budget, but let's not gut either the dividend or the…
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Comments
Taylor Bickford His argument, if I understand it correctly, is that capping the PFD is a tax, and a less desirable one than other options that are on the table. He does acknowledge that Alaskans will have to pay their way, so the implication here, I think, is that we should close the shortfall with another tax, like an income tax or a sales tax. I guess whether you view a PFD cap as a tax is actually insignificant, because he's not advocating against taxes per se. Protect Alaskans from the PFD cap tax by taxing them in other ways. Am I missing something?
LikeReply6 hrsEdited
Brad Keithley I think so. Because it is so regressive, is focused entirely on Alaskans and, because the PFD is so broad based, under some circumstances a PFD cut actually hurts the state economy more than it helps and when viewed as a tax it is the worst economically of all the options. I think some are trying to avoid that analysis by calling it something other than a tax. More on that tomorrow on my Dukes segment.
LikeReply2 hrsEdited
Taylor Bickford Well if we are simply weighing it as a tax vs. tax, that changes the conversation and should take a lot of the emotion out of it. I'm not a tax expert or an economist, so I'll be interested to see the arguments made by you and others to understand the relative economic impacts of all these various proposals (I think Gunnar Knapp is working on something like this for the Legislature). It's not just about economic impact, though - you also need to understand the relative impact each solution will have on the budget deficit. If you forego a PFD cap in favor of a sales tax, then you have more work to do on the deficit itself, which requires another solution with another set of economic impacts. Back to the tax discussion - in order to view a PFD cap as a tax, you have to believe that the money is *yours* to begin with. I know what the Constitution says, but I've always viewed the dividend as a privilege rather than a right, which is not the same way I view the money I take home from the fruits of my labor.
LikeReply1 hrEdited
Brad Keithley Ahhh, you tumbled quickly to the core issue ("privilege or right"), exactly the subject of my discussion tomorrow with Dukes and which leads us directly back to what Clem (and others, Hammond wrote on this some as well) had to say on the issue, since they were much closer in time to the issue than us.

As you will see from his writings, Clem believes that it is a right, and there is substantial support for that. Because individuals effectively are prevented from directly owning mineral interests in Alaska under the statehood act (something which is natural in every other state and a key to the economies of those states) , Clem and others believed that the PFD was the only mechanism available to them to convey a similar interest to Alaskans. It -- half of the earnings from the PF -- was, in essence, the royalty share due individual Alaskans (and the state's private economy) for the production from the lands Alaskans were compelled to own collectively, rather than permitted (as in other states) to own individually. Extrapolating from that, certainly it is your right to view it as a privilege and to give your share away, but it is not your right to make the same judgment and simply take it away from everyone else.

As for the economics, both Scott and Gunnar actually already have talked about that in a way. Here is Scott's take: "“[M]ost of the cash from dividends will ultimately find its way into the Alaska economy to increase employment, population, and income. … [If the dividend instead had been diverted to state government,] the most likely alternative use of the PFD would probably have been to increase capital spending by state government. … Capital spending would have generated less employment and increased income inequality.”http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/.../bien_xiii_ak_pfd...

Here is Gunnar's: "Preliminary findings show, for example, that cutting $100 million by laying off state workers will cost the economy significantly more jobs and income than would an income tax to raise the same amount. ... " The article also discusses a sales tax. The option not mentioned (because it would do the most economic harm), cutting the PFD. http://www.adn.com/.../how-balancing-budget-could-harm...

I agree it may make the politics of resolving the deficit more difficult, but the Alaska economy isn't only about the government economy, more than half of the economy is privately driven and it is about to go through significant turmoil as well as oil projects start ramping down. We need to do evaluations based on what is in the best interest of the #overall Alaska economy. Retaining the PFD (to keep those dollars in the private economy) is part of that.
LikeReply56 minsEdited

Saturday, December 26, 2015

Current Crude Oil Price Forecasts (as of 12.26.2015) ...



During a recent discussion I suggested that the oil price forecast embedded in the Administration's most recent 10-year budget plan was too low and, thus, tended to overdramatize the extent of Alaska's current fiscal situation.  Others challenged that view, suggesting instead that the Administration's outlook was too optimistic.

While a number of public and private entities publish oil price forecasts I have gathered above the most recent set of long-range forecasts made by a selection of organizations that I generally look to when assessing the current outlook for prices.  With the exception of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), I believe that all of the forecasts are stated in nominal (inflation adjusted) dollars and, with the exception of the DOR (Alaska Department of Revenue) forecast, all are focused either entirely or in significant part on Brent or comparable, waterborne crudes.

Adjusting the IMF number for inflation would put it slightly above the World Bank projection.  The price for ANS generally trades at a slight ($1-$2) discount to Brent, although in recent days sometimes it has been higher than the reported Brent price.

When making the comment I had in mind particularly the DOR forecast price for 2020 ($71), which is about $10 (or roughly 12%) below the most recent forecasts by the IEA (International Energy Agency) and OPEC.  Extrapolating from estimates included as part of the DOR's Fall 2015 Revenue Sources Book the difference is worth about $300 million in additional annual revenue to Alaska, certainly not enough to close the immediate cash budget gap, but a not insignificant amount when viewing the process as putting a series of pieces in place.

While I appreciate that the World Bank and IMF (both global financing agencies) have projected lower prices for the same period, my experience has been that the EIA, IEA and OPEC tend to have a better handle on future price trends and thus, when there are differences, tend to give more weight to them.